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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals of the State of Utah has 
jurisdiction to review final agency actions, orders, or decrees 
which are the result of formal adjudicative proceedings through 
Utah Code Annotated Sections 63-46b-16 and 78-2a-3(2)(a) and (b). 
NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This appeal is from the decision of the Third District 
Court affirming the final decision of the Salt Lake County Career 
Service Council ("CSC"). 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
I. Did the District Court abuse its discretion by 
affirming the decision of the CSC sustaining the termination of 
Ralph Tolman? 
II. Was Mr. Tolman deprived of his right to minimum due 
process due to his property interest in continued employment with 
Salt Lake County? 
III. Did the CSC commit reversible error by failing to 
rule on Appellant's motions regarding "nexus?" 
IV. Did the County Attorney's Office impose double 
jeopardy for events that were the subject of former discipline? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This appeal is from the decision of the Third District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah affirming the 
final decision of the CSC# an inferior tribunal exercising judicial 
1 
functions. The CSC sustained the termination of employment of 
Ralph Tolman from his position as an investigator with the Salt 
Lake County Attorney's Office. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. Ralph Tolman was originally employed by Salt Lake 
County on January 25, 1971 as a deputy sheriff until he began 
working for the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office ("CAO") on or 
about April 1, 1980. (656,21-657,9)1 
2. Tolman graduated number one out 29 in his police 
academy class. (643,6-7) During his nine years with the sheriff's 
department, Tolman always had above-standard performance apprais-
als. (655,9-13) He also received numerous commendations during 
his employment with the CAO investigative unit. (723,8-728,24) 
3. Tolman spent two years on the Arson Task Force for 
the CAO. (661,3-11) During that two years, he was a supervisor. 
(660,2-10) While on the Task Force, Tolman received above-
standard ratings and was never disciplined. (661,3-14) 
4. The lowest performance appraisal Tolman ever received 
from the county was a 73. A score of 73 is only one point below 
the above-standard rating. (664,7-15; 329,21-23) 
1
 Citations to the record give the page, line on which the 
reference begins, followed by a (-) to indicate continuous cite to 
the page, and line on which the reference ends. Multiple 
references are separated by a semi-colon. 
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5. Tolman had a good reputation as a police officer and 
his closest associates as an investigator would have no problem 
with his returning to work if he were exonerated. (477,7-10; 
451,18-452,4; 503,10-24; 562,6-13; 605,2-5; 766,23-767,1) 
6. Tolman received a letter giving notice of intent to 
terminate his employment with CAO on or about September 8, 1986. 
(Exhibit "A".) 
7. Tolman grieved his termination. This culminated in 
a hearing before the CSC conducted over the course of two weeks in 
November 1986 which resulted in the CSC sustaining Tolman's 
termination. (Exhibit "B".) 
8. At the beginning of the hearing the CSC stated that 
it was not bound by formal rules of evidence. It saw its role as 
an information gathering body. (54,5-11) Counsel for Tolman spent 
considerable time trying to convince the CSC that this was a 
difficult case involving sophisticated issues of law and fact 
requiring it to focus on questions of law and make rulings on those 
questions. 
9. Tolman never had an alcohol related problem on the 
job. (286,5-7) Further, at the time he went to work for the 
county, Tolman did not abuse alcohol. (519,17-21) 
10. The CAO Policy maintains that there are times when 
investigators are clearly off-duty. (307,10-20) The CAO has no 
rule prohibiting the off-duty consumption of alcohol, in fact, the 
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Investigators' Division of the CAO had no policy at all regarding 
off-duty consumption of alcohol. (287,8-11; 287,19-22; 308,9-12) 
11. The CAO had no consistent policy regarding multiple 
arrests or convictions for DUI. (372,14-17) 
12. Neither the CAO nor Salt Lake County Sheriff's 
Department gave training regarding what constituted appropriate 
off-duty conduct for an investigator or a deputy sheriff. (719, 
17-25) 
13. Tolman was never warned that his private domestic 
disputes would be brought into his work environment and made the 
basis of a termination action. (720,4-10) 
14. Tolman was arrested in 1981 on suspicion of DUI. 
(77,4-79,14) He plead guilty to a charge of reckless driving which 
resulted in the loss of a previously approved extra meritorious 5% 
raise. (662, 1-19) 
15. Tolman received no clear warning that another DUI 
incident would result in disciplinary action. (105,9-12) 
16. Sometime between 1981 and 1985 at the Sage Lounge, 
Midvale City police officers believed Tolman was about to attempt 
to drive while intoxicated. They had him arrange for his father 
to drive him home. He was not arrested. (112,1-119,12) 
17. In October 1985, a verbal altercation occurred 
between Tolman and John Harrington of KTVX news. Although there 
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was "salty" language used, Tolman never lost control of himself. 
(309,18-313,8; 416,6-10; 469,10-20) 
18. As a result of the incident with Harrington, Tolman 
received the lowest performance appraisal he ever received — 73. 
(666,9-667,7) Following the lowering of his performance appraisal 
score, the Harrington incident was not mentioned in subsequent 
evaluations. (376,3-11) 
19. Tolman's fortune at the CAO dropped in November 1985 
as a result of the leak of the Murray fire report. (675,24-676,6; 
676,13-677,15) Don Harmon, Tolman's second level supervisor, told 
Bradley Adamson that Tolman was going to be fired for his 
involvement in the Murray fire report. (557,14-558,6) 
20. Tolman was involved in an affair with Margo Bergvall 
for several years. Their relationship was volatile. (171,9-19; 
206,23-207,16) 
21. On June 10, 1986, while off duty, Tolman caught 
Bergvall and David Nielsen nude and engaging in sex in Bergvall's 
hot tub which resulted in a verbal and physical altercation. 
(695,17-696,9; 173,7-179,18; 215,10-11) 
22. On the following morning, while still off duty, 
Tolman stopped by Bergvall's home. Another altercation occurred 
when Tolman learned that Nielsen had spent the night. (328,1-4; 
180,7-182,18; 699,21-700,10) 
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23. The altercation between Tolman, Bergvall, and 
Nielsen was a domestic matter arising from the affair between 
Tolman and Bergvall. (696,10-698,8) 
24. Tolman spoke of the altercation at his work soon 
after the incident. Tolman's supervisor, Sam Dawson, was aware of 
the incident yet no action was taken against Tolman until August 
1986. (177,22-23; 268,23-269,1; 705,2-25) 
25. Bergvall was not contacted by CAO investigators 
regarding the June altercation until after August 16, 1986. 
(192,19-22; 354,11-19) 
26. In December 1985, a meeting was held in the CAO to 
discuss a change in the policy regarding personal use of county 
cars. Direction concerning the policy change was confusing at best 
and not made available in written form to investigators until seven 
months after the meeting. (308,21; 309,6; 670,7-16; 285,8-25) 
27. Tolman was accused of misusing an office vehicle. 
This resulted in a meeting between Tolman and Don Harmon. Tolman 
learned, approximately 30 days later, that he had been secretly 
placed on probation. (449,2-8; 670,18-671,12; 671,13-22) 
28. Harmon admitted to Jim Burns that he was singling 
out Tolman on the mileage issue. (449,24-450,4) 
29. Tolman was considered to be a political foe of Ted 
Cannon by some in the office. Olin Yearby testified that Cannon 
told him and Tolman and others that they would be "dead meat" 
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regardless of who won the 1986 primary election (for County 
Attorney) in the Republican party. (498,3-499,12) 
30. The political pressure in the CAO during the 1986 
campaign year became out of hand. Tolman, among others, was 
singled out because of his political involvement. (761,2-14; 
559,22-25; 560,18-22) 
31. Tolman's employment was threatened because of the 
Livingston Report (dealing with allegations that Roger Livingston 
had conspired to commit insurance fraud regarding a leased 
automobile). Cannon let it be known that Tolman was responsible 
for leaking the Livingston Report and that he was going to be 
fired. Don Harmon made a similar threat against Tolman for the 
same reason. (450,22-451,10; 435,9-13; 435,17-18) 
32. Cannon appeared on KALL radio on August 15, 1986 
and publicly claimed that Tolman had been responsible for leaking 
the Livingston Report. (715,4-15) 
33. Upon hearing Cannon's public accusations Tolman 
began drinking and within hours of Cannon's accusations he had been 
arrested for DUI. (715,18-716,6; 716,13-23) 
34. Tolman did not try to avoid arrest by using his 
police status. He eventually plead guilty to reckless driving. 
(161,3-5) 
35. Other CAO employees were arrested for DUI, but were 
not terminated. After Tolman's arrest, Dawson solicited any and 
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all incriminating evidence against Tolman, (98,9-22; 162,20-
163,11; 275,21-276,9; 370,13-22; 437,3-5; 629,17-630,6; 746,20-
747,14) 
36. The CAO asked for a report on the years-old Sage 
Lounge incident after the August 16, 1986 DUI arrest. (367,12-
368,9-21) 
37. The August 16, 1986 DUI arrest was not enough on 
its own merits to terminate Tolman. (352,21-353,12) 
38. According to Dawson, neither the car mileage issue, 
the Sage Lounge incident, nor the Harrington incident were enough 
to sustain Tolman's termination. (352,6-12; 353,13-14; 352,2-5) 
39. The CSC allowed the CAO to present the unsworn 
statement of David Nielsen as evidence through Sam Dawson over the 
vigorous objections of counsel for Tolman. Nielsen refused to 
appear before the CSC. The CSC refused to obtain a court order 
compelling Nielsen to appear. Counsel for Tolman advised the CSC 
that it was committing reversible error by allowing the CAO to 
carry its burden of proof on the basis of hearsay. (233,2-240,20; 
238,5-240,16) 
40. As a result of the CSC's rulings concerning David 
Nielsen, counsel for Tolman moved that the proceedings be dismissed 
with prejudice because of the prejudicial hearsay allowed. The CSC 
ruled that it was not bound by legal rules and allowed Dawson to 
testify on behalf of Nielsen. (242,20-243,1; 244,15-23) 
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41. Counsel for Tolman conducted no cross examination 
of Dawson while he testified for Nielsen. (260,1-9) 
42. Harmon interviewed Bergvall concerning the June 10 
and 11 incidents with Tolman. A tape recording was made of that 
interview. During a pre-hearing conference, counsel for Tolman 
made a motion for administrative discovery of all interview 
transcripts concerning the June 10 and 11 incidents. The Bergvall 
transcript was never obtained by Tolman. (270,16-22; 12,14-19,6) 
43. During the same pre-hearing conference, counsel for 
Tolman raised the issue of "secret" personnel files asking for a 
ruling that Tolman be given access to all personnel file 
information that was to be used in the hearing or that any such 
secret information not be allowed in the hearing. The CSC refused 
both requests. (12,14-33,8; 33,9-34,17) 
44. Dawson refused to turn over the names of the people 
who told him about the Bergvall incident claiming executive 
privilege and obligation to keep the information in confidence. 
The CSC allowed him to do this. (355,1-356,25) 
45. The CSC ignored Tolmanfs prehearing motions 
regarding the concepts of nexus and double jeopardy. (37,3-44,11) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
At issue in this case are several questions. The chief 
among them are questions of law. The proper standard of review to 
be applied is one of "correction of error". This standard does not 
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require this court to defer at all to the judgment of the CSC or 
the district court. Even if the strictest standard of review, were 
applicable here — that applied to questions of fact — the result 
is the same. This court should reverse Tolman's termination. Many 
facts were considered in reaching the decision to affirm the CAO's 
termination of Tolman that should not have been allowed for 
consideration. 
Tolman's employment as an investigator with the CAO was 
terminated in 1986. He received a hearing before the CSC which 
was in turn appealed to the third district court. Tolman did not 
receive due process throughout this procedure. The CAO was 
permitted to refer to documents and records which were denied to 
Tolman. Additionally, crucial testimony was admitted under very 
questionable circumstances. The unsworn statement of a witness 
was allowed to be read into the record by a CAO investigator. The 
witness was available. He simply chose to ignore the order to 
appear. Such questionable procedure resulted in the violation of 
Tolman's constitutional right to due process. 
The CSC wrongfully received and considered evidence of 
Tolman's activities which were not prohibited by the County. The 
CAO neglected to comply with the nexus rule. Evidence was admitted 
against Tolman without a specific connection being made between 
Tolman's behavior and the efficiency of the CAO. The CSC refused 
to rule on Tolman's motions concerning nexus. 
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Furthermore, even if there were justification of the 
imposition of a penalty, the penalty of termination should have 
been mitigated substantially downward* Considering, among other 
things, Tolman's past work and disciplinary record; the consistency 
of the penalty in relation to that applied to others and to the 
table of penalties; the lack of impact of the offense on the CAO; 
the general lack of notice of the violation of any rules, and 
Tolman's potential for rehabilitation, termination of Tolman's 
employment was too severe. 
Finally, the CAO based its decision to terminate Tolman, 
at least in part, on past actions for which Tolman had already been 
disciplined. The CAO may not punish Tolman twice for the same 
misconduct. Discounting the actions for which Tolman had already 
been disciplined and the actions for which the CAO could not comply 
with the nexus rule, Tolman could not be terminated. None of his 
actions, standing on their own, were enough to lead to termination. 
By allowing the CAO to punish Tolman a second time for earlier 
misconduct, Tolman was wrongfully terminated. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
BY AFFIRMING THE CAREER SERVICE COUNCIL DECISION 
SUSTAINING THE TERMINATION OF RALPH TOLMAN. 
In a recent case from the Utah Court of Appeals, 
Taylor v. Utah State Training School, 775 P.2d 432 (Ut. App. 1989), 
filed May 26, 1989, a very clear statement of proper standard of 
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review of an administrative decision is set forth. Three standards 
of review are commonly employed in appellate review of agency 
decisions/ Department of Administrative Services v. Public Service 
Commission, 658 P.2d 601 (Utah 1983). According to Judge Orme's 
decision in Taylor, these standards operate on a continuum ranging 
from questions of pure fact on which the appellate court defers to 
the agency's findings if they are supported by substantial 
evidence, to questions of general law to which the "correction of 
error" standard is applied. Id. at 608. 
In instances where an agency's decision intertwines legal 
interpretation of key provisions of the relevant statutes and the 
basic facts of the case, the court applies a sliding scale. Where 
questions of law predominate the court gives less deference to the 
agency determination. "Even with respect to the [agency's] 
construction of its organic statute, we do not defer unless the 
[agency] by virtue of expertise and experience . . . is in a 
superior position to give effect to the regulatory objective." Big 
K Corporation v. Public Service Commission, 689 P.2d 1349, 1353 
(Utah 1984). Where issues of law and fact are mixed, the court 
should apply a reasonableness standard. Taylor at 37. On the 
other hand, the "correction of error" standard should apply to 
agency decisions involving statutory interpretations. Hurley v. 
Board of Reviews, 767 P.2d 524 (Utah 1988). 
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Certain issues raised by Mr. Tolman in this appeal will 
require this court to apply the "correction of error" standard as 
described above. Accordingly, little or no deference should be 
given the determination of the CSC or the district court with 
respect to questions of law. 
Consequently, the CSC should be reversed on those points 
where this court's view of the applicable issues of law deviates 
from that of the CSC. To the extent that the CSC has erroneously 
interpreted the law, they have abused their discretion and must be 
reversed. 
In reviewing the district court's decision affirming the 
decision of the CSC, this court should utilize the same "correction 
of error" standard the district court should have used in reviewing 
the CSC's decision. The issues raised in this appeal are questions 
of law. Tolman claims the CSC did not afford him due process of 
law. The question of due process is a legal one. Tolman also 
claims the CSC committed reversible error by failing to rule on his 
motions concerning "nexus." Nexus is a purely legal theory. Hence 
the question is a legal one. Tolman also claims he was submitted 
to double jeopardy by the CAO. His termination was expressly 
based, at least in part, on action for which had already been 
disciplined. The principle of double jeopardy is again legal. 
Once again the question is a legal one requiring the correction of 
error standard. The Utah Supreme Court held in Oates v. Chavez, 
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749 P.2d 658 (Utah 1988), that a trial court's conclusions of law 
are "accorded no particular deference". Id. at 659. See also 
Wessel v. Erickson Landscaping Co., 711 P.2d 250 (Utah 1985). 
The issues are questions of law which require no 
deference, simply the correction of error standard. However, even 
if the strictest standard of review — that for questions of fact -
- were required for this appeal, the district court's decision 
should be reversed. The standard of review for questions of fact 
is an arbitrary and capricious standard. The United States Supreme 
Court has held that such a standard is met if the decision was made 
with consideration of factors not intended to be considered or if 
there is a failure to consider an important aspect of the problem. 
Motor Vehicle Manufacturer's Association v. State Farm Mutual 
Automobile Insurance Co., 463 U.S. 29 (1983). The CSC and the 
trial court failed to consider important facts relating to Tolman's 
nexus, due process, and double jeopardy. The manifest lack of 
consideration of these factors as well as the consideration of 
facts relating to previous and unrelated incidents involving Tolman 
equates to an arbitrary and capricious disposition of this case. 
POINT II: MR. TOLMAN IS ENTITLED TO MINIMUM DUE PROCESS 
DUE TO HIS PROPERTY INTEREST IN CONTINUED 
EMPLOYMENT WITH SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Salt Lake County Policies and Procedures provide that the 
presiding officials shall conduct fair and impartial hearings. 
Policy No. 5715. In order to have any protection at all, a merit 
14 
covered employee must be afforded procedural due process. In order 
for procedure! due process to have meaning, it must include as a 
minimum fair notice and fair hearing. Implicit in both the Salt 
Lake County Policy and the general law of procedural due process 
as set forth in Cleveland Board of Education v. Loudermill, 105 
S.Ct. 1487 (1985), is the requirement that a final decision by the 
CSC may not be affirmed on appeal if it is shown that an error by 
the presiding official substantially affected the parties' rights. 
This court had opportunity to address this issue recently 
in D.B. v. Division of Occupational Professional Licensing. 779 
P.2d 1145 (Utah 1989). That case was factually very similar to the 
instant case. The plaintiff in D.B. was denied the opportunity to 
cross examine a chief witness against him. The relevant testimony 
was sworn to but simply read into the record. This court held in 
that case that the plaintiff had been denied his due process 
rights. Quoting State Department of Community Affairs v. Utah 
Merit System Council, 614 P.2d 1259, 1262 (Utah 1980), this court 
held that "the more liberal the practice in admitting testimony, 
the more imperative the obligation to preserve the essential rules 
of evidence". This court further held that all parties must be 
apprised of all the evidence submitted or considered. This court 
further held that all parties must also be given the right not only 
to cross examine witnesses but to inspect all documents and offer 
evidence to explain or rebut. Id. at 1146. 
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A quick comparison of the facts in D.B. to the case at 
bar illustrates that Tolman was denied his due process rights. As 
per the statement of facts above, the statement of David Nielsen 
was read into the record by a CAO investigator. The statement was 
not even sworn as was the statement of the witness in D.B.. 
Furthermore, as per the statement of facts above, Tolman was also 
denied access to records and documents used by the CAO. Clearly, 
the facts in this case are much more egregious than those in D.B. . 
Tolman was denied his due process rights. Therefore, the decision 
of the CSC and the district court should be reversed and Tolman 
reinstated to his former position. 
This rule is also discussed in Raaland v. Internal 
Revenue Service, 6 M.S.P.B. 565 (1981). Mere deviation from the 
best procedure does not constitute reversible error. In Raaland, 
the presiding official conversed with the agency representative but 
not with appellant's representative concerning the continuation of 
a hearing. This was inappropriate but not a prejudicial 
communication. When error is more substantial, such as when the 
agency submits material evidence to a presiding official that is 
not provided to the appellant, Rucker v. Department of Treasury, 
6 M.S.P.B. 80 (1981), the case should be remanded on appeal for the 
appellant to respond to the evidence. 
Traditionally, with regard to adjudicative errors by 
presiding officials, the court looks to deprivation of substantive 
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rights. The court in review of administrative errors of this sort 
should look for guidance to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Rule 61, which states that "The court at every stage of the pro-
ceeding must disregard an error or defect in the proceedings which 
does not effect the substantial rights of the parties." A similar 
provision is found in Rule 61 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
However, when the deviation becomes so substantial as to effect the 
substantial rights of the parties, the court is justified in modi-
fying the outcome based upon a deprivation of due process. 
For example, in Lockner v. Department of Transportation, 
DC 07528110695 (1983), the Federal Merit Systems Protection Board 
("M.S.P.B.") reversed and remanded a grievance case after finding 
that the presiding official made a substantial number of erroneous 
evidentiary rulings concerning the examination of witnesses in 
introduction and exclusion of evidence. The hearing was considered 
unfair because the presiding official repeatedly allowed the agency 
representative to ask leading questions, allowed critical agency 
witnesses to testify from previously prepared statements without 
any indication that they could not recollect events, and, in 
addition, chastised appellant's counsel for raising objections that 
were properly made. In that case, as in the one presently before 
the court, the M.S.P.B. said that although it would not strictly 
apply the Federal Rules of Evidence in actions before it, the 
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evidentiary errors by the presiding official severely curtailed the 
appellant's substantive right to a fair and impartial hearing. 
Peters v. United States, 408 F.2d 719 (Ct. CI. 1969) 
contains an extensive treatment of when an administrative 
tribunal's failure to adequately control the admission of evidence 
under a system where the technical rules of evidence are not 
followed constitutes arbitrary and capricious acts of the tribunal. 
In that case, an Air Force employee was discharged for accepting 
bribes. The evidence establishing the taking of the bribes was in 
the form of sworn "Affidavits" which were admitted through the 
testimony of the person to whom the statements were made and who 
administered the oath. The employee challenged his dismissal on 
the basis that the tribunal had committed error in admitting this 
evidence. He lost his appeal on this point but the court's 
discussion illustrates what elements are essential through the 
admissability of what is clearly harmful hearsay evidence. 
The characteristics of evidence which made it proper for 
the tribunal to accept it were: (1) it was probably an admission 
against the penal interests of the declarant, thus satisfying one 
of the tests of reliability hearsay; (2) it was testimony sworn 
under oath, even though it did not meet all the requirements of a 
formal affidavit; (3) it was offered into evidence in connection 
with the testimony of the person who administered the oath; (4) it 
was the best source of the information since the declarants were 
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not susceptible to the subpoena power of the tribunal; (5) the 
tribunal did not have subpoena power; and (6) the plaintiff had not 
made an affirmative attempt to secure the attendance of the 
declarants. 
In the present case, none of these elements is satisfied 
in the incident where witness Sam Dawson of the CAO was allowed to 
testify on behalf of David Nielsen based upon the transcript of an 
interview. The necessary conclusion is that the "testimony" of 
David Nielsen spoken into the record by Sam Dawson was so 
unreliable, and the procedure used to get it into the record over 
objection of Mr. Tolman's counsel was so arbitrary, that it cannot 
be allowed. Moreover, even if there is no prejudice in terms of 
whether Mr. Nielsen's "testimony" is substantial evidence, this 
episode illustrates just how chaotic the hearing process was, and 
how eager the Career Service Council was to hear improper evidence 
that was highly prejudicial to Mr. Tolman. Again, applying the 
D.B. rationale, the decision of the CSC and the district court must 
be reversed. 
The record reflects the gymnastics to which the CAO went 
to allow one of the managers who wanted to fire Tolman to "testify" 
for Nielsen. Nielsen was not "unavailable" as that term is used 
in the Rules of Evidence. 
Nielsen's "testimony" was not against his interest. He 
was, at most, an interested party in the sense that he stood to be 
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embarrassed by the testimony of Mr. Tolman. In fact, he had a bias 
due to the fact that he was vying against Mr. Tolman for the 
affection and attention of Margo Bergvall. 
Mr. Nielsen's testimony was not sworn. It was given 
under suspicious circumstances. No investigation was ever done in 
relation to this incident until nearly two months after the fact. 
Nothing was done until the issue of a possible termination for a 
DUI arrest came up. It was given in response to the solicitation 
of the county attorney's office, not as a result of a voluntary 
complaint by Mrs. Bergvall. 
The testimony was entered by Sam Dawson. Dawson was not 
even the person who conducted the interview. Dawson did not 
administer any oath. Nielsen never stated he was testifying as if 
under oath in court. Not even the most minimal effort was made to 
assure the veracity of what was testified to. Furthermore, there 
are significant discrepancies between the sworn testimony of Mr. 
Tolman and the statements of Nielsen. 
Nielsen would have been the best source of testimony; 
however, he was susceptible to subpoena and was, in fact, served 
subpoenas by both sides. By its enabling statute and rules, the 
Career Service Council has subpoena power. Mr. Tolman served 
Nielsen with a valid subpoena issued by the Career Service Council. 
Nielsen refused to obey it. On the record, counsel for Mr. Tolman 
asked the CSC to cooperate in seeking a warrant through Third 
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District Court for the arrest and production in the hearing of Mr. 
Nielsen to give testimony. The CSC refused. Mr. Tolman did 
everything possible to attempt to remedy the dilemma. Counsel for 
Mr. Tolman told the CSC that if it were a court of law, he would 
instruct his client to walk out of the proceedings, suffer a 
default to be taken against him and challenge the impropriety of 
the CSC's actions on appeal, rather than risk the prejudice of such 
unsworn, unreliable evidence. In short, Mr. Tolman is in no way 
responsible for the "unavailability" of Nielsen. Mr. Tolman fully 
discharged his burden to obtain Nielsen's presence at the hearing. 
Nielsen's statements were inflammatory and extremely 
prejudicial to Mr. Tolman's right to a fair hearing. Mr. Tolman 
maintains that the entire episode with Margo Bergvall, David 
Nielsen, and the hot tub was improper for consideration by the CSC. 
It was all off-duty conduct whose relevance was not established 
through proper evidence and nexus as discussed below. Thus, the 
harm to Mr. Tolman was substantial and beyond his ability to 
overcome at the hearing. 
No evidence of the hot tub incident should have been 
allowed. Nexus is a legal issue clearly within the purview of the 
CSC to decide. Timely motions were made to exclude such evidence 
Mr. Tolman's counsel even provided the CSC with a memorandum of law 
to explain the concept. The CSC acted arbitrarily and capriciously 
in failing to rule on the motion and further compounded the error 
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by allowing the statements of Nielsen into the record through 
hearsay. 
According to Utah law, Peatross v. Board of Commissioners 
of Salt Lake County, 555 P.2d 281 (Utah 1976), if an administrative 
tribunal acts in excess of its authority or in a manner so clearly 
outside reason that its action must be deemed capricious and 
arbitrary, the reviewing court may review the entire matter, 
including matters of tribunal discretion. The Nielsen incident 
also constituted reversible error on the part of the CSC because 
Mr. Tolman was deprived of his fundamental right to a fair hearing 
due to his inability to challenge the veracity of Nielsen's 
statements through cross examination. The effect of the loss of 
the right to cross examine was substantial in that Mr. Nielsen was 
a key witness whose testimony bore directly on the credibility of 
Margo Bergvall, the primary complaining witness against Mr. Tolman. 
Had the CSC been given an opportunity through cross examination to 
believe that Ms. Bergvall was less than candid in her testimony, 
then it might have found no reason to charge Mr. Tolman with off-
duty violation adequate to sustain a termination. 
Furthermore, counsel for Mr. Tolman made a motion at the 
preliminary hearing held on November 3, 1986 to compel discovery 
of any exculpatory material that may have been contained in the 
tape transcripts of interviews with Margo Bergvall and David 
Nielsen. The CSC failed to act upon this motion. Had it 
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appropriately acted, there may have been some clarity as to what 
was going to happen with Mr. Nielsen alleviating the need to enter 
his testimony by way of hearsay transcripts. Mr. Tolman should, 
as a minimum, have been given a copy of the transcript of this 
interview at the earliest juncture, but was not. Mr. Tolman did 
not have access to the Nielsen interview transcript until he was 
confronted with its reading at the hearing when Mr. Dawson read the 
transcript into the record. 
In the preliminary hearing, Mr. Campbell stated for the 
record that the CAO had obtained a transcript of the tape recording 
of Margo Bergvall, but that he was not aware of any other 
transcript or tape recording pertaining to the termination of Mr. 
Tolman. At this juncture, Mr. Campbell should have revealed to Mr. 
Tolman and his counsel that a transcript of the Nielsen interview 
had been made and should have made it available to Mr. Tolman. 
Counsel for Mr. Tolman responded to Mr. Campbell and to 
the CSC in the form of a motion that any information that had not 
been turned over in discovery for whatever purpose not be admitted 
at the hearing. 
Mr. Campbell indicated that notes were taken of the Margo 
Bergvall interview and possibly the David Nielsen interview, but 
also claimed that those were attorney work product and refused to 
turn them over. Counsel for Mr. Tolman pointed out to the CSC that 
since time did not allow formal discovery by way of deposition, Mr. 
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Tolman was very much more reliant upon full and appropriate 
disclosure by the CAO than he would normally have been. 
Sherry Guyon, a member of the CSC, made a list of motions 
made by counsel for Mr. Tolman at the preliminary hearing. Despite 
all of the efforts of counsel for Mr. Tolman to assure that there 
was complete discovery of all materials to be used at the hearing, 
despite diligent effort to produce Mr. Nielsen as a witness at the 
hearing, despite vigorous objection of the use of Mr. Nielsen's 
hearsay testimony, and despite the clearly prejudicial nature of 
the Nielsen testimony in the form that it was presented, the CSC 
allowed the Nielsen statements to be entered into the record and 
ultimately base the decision to sustain the termination, at least 
in part, upon information to which the Nielsen testimony related. 
This alone constituted a serious deprivation of Mr. Tolman's due 
process rights to fair hearing. As a matter of law the court 
should reverse the CSC decision on this basis alone. 
Further elements of substantial procedural errors form 
a basis for reversal of the CSC decision. According to Cash v. 
Industrial Commission. 556 P.2d 827, 27 Ariz. App. 526 (1976), 
although administrative agencies may be relieved from strict 
observance of common law rules of evidence, their hearings must, 
nonetheless, be conducted consistent with fundamental principles 
which inhere in due process of law. The CSC steadfastly refused 
to rule upon prehearing dispositive motions claiming that it needed 
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to hear "all of the evidence" and then sort out what was relevant 
to the case. The failure of the CSC to rule on these dispositive 
motions constituted again a serious violation of a substantial 
right of Mr. Tolman. As a minimum Mr. Tolman had a right to have 
dispositive motions ruled upon rather than held in abeyance. Not 
a single dispositive motion was ruled upon by the Career Service 
Council prior to hearing, nor during the course of the hearing, nor 
at the conclusion of the hearing. 
Exhibit "C", Statement of Issues by Grievant submitted 
prior to the prehearing conference in the Tolman matter illustrates 
several of the dispositive matters that were ignored by the CSC. 
For example, the issue of the exclusionary rule was raised on Page 
4 of Exhibit "C". At the commencement of the hearing, the CAO 
appeared with an armed deputy sheriff whose purpose was to sit in 
the hearing room throughout the proceedings ostensibly to protect 
the witnesses from any harm at the hands of Mr. Tolman. Counsel 
for Mr. Tolman vociferously objected to presence of an armed guard 
to no avail.2 The CSC allowed the guard to be present in the 
hearing chambers throughout the entire hearing despite its obvious 
prejudicial effect and despite the fact that nothing occurred to 
give the slightest justification for the presence of anyone in 
violation of the exlusionary rule let alone an armed guard. 
2
 The entire episode of the armed guard occurred off the 
record. 
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Failure of the CSC to exclude the armed guard was prejudicial and 
should be grounds for reversal. 
Exhibit "C" also refers to the issue of condonation and 
performance appraisals at Page 6. At the prehearing conference, 
counsel for Mr. Tolman made a motion to eliminate from the hearing 
any documentary evidence not contained in Mr. Tolman's personnel 
file. This motion was made in conjunction with the previously 
mentioned motion for complete discovery of all material to be 
presented by the terminating agency at the hearing. The incident 
involved in the testimony of David Nielsen is but one example of 
the use of documentary evidence not contained in Mr. Tolman's 
personnel file which was prejudicially allowed into the record. 
The error of the CSC was in failing to rule upon the prehearing 
motion to exclude such evidence, failing at the hearing to exclude 
such evidence upon specific objection by counsel for Mr. Tolman, 
and failure to rectify its error at the conclusion of the hearing 
by excluding any such prejudicial information from forming the 
basis of the ultimate decision. 
CSC violated Mr. Tolman's due process rights by failing 
to rule both prehearing, during the hearing, and post hearing on 
the issue of nexus. A more complete discussion of the concept of 
nexus is provided below. At the prehearing conference on November 
3, 1986, counsel for Mr. Tolman presented the CSC with oral and 
written argument on the issue of nexus, asking the CSC to rule that 
26 
any evidence of off-duty conduct be excluded due to failure of the 
CAO to meet its burden of proof that there was sufficient nexus 
between off-duty conduct and the efficiency of the CAO in carrying 
out its legal responsibilities. 
Finally, at various junctures throughout the hearing, 
counsel for Mr. Tolman raised objections to the admission of 
certain evidence based upon the fact that there had been no ruling 
on the prehearing motions pertaining to such evidence and upon the 
fact that such evidence was either prejudicial or hearsay or 
irrelevant based upon the concept of nexus. The CSC chastised 
counsel for Mr. Tolman with the admonition that its proper function 
was to hear "all of the facts" and sort out those which are rele-
vant. Repeated statements were made to the effect that the CSC was 
not bound by the technical rules of procedure or evidence. Repeat-
edly
 # counsel for Mr. Tolman reminded the CSC that despite the 
authority of the CSC to conduct hearings without strict reliance 
on technical rules of evidence or procedure, fundamental rights of 
Mr. Tolman were being affected by the conduct of the hearing. 
POINT III: THE CAREER SERVICE COUNSEL COMMITTED REVERSIBLE 
ERROR BY FAILING TO RULE ON APPELLANT'S 
MOTIONS REGARDING "NEXUS" 
On November 3, 1986, several days before the commencement 
of the hearing in this matter, Mr. Tolman made several motions at 
a pretrial hearing among which was the legal issue of "nexus" and 
the impact it would have on the proper scope of the termination 
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hearing. The motion was taken under advisement by the CSC; no 
ruling was issued prior to the opening of the hearing. Counsel for 
Mr. Tolman asked the CSC for its ruling on the nexus issue 
immediately before the first witness was called by the CAO. The 
CSC's decision was a "non-decision." Essentially it ruled that is 
function was to gather facts in an informal setting free from the 
technical restraints of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. Thus, 
Mr. Tolman's nexus motion was denied over his protest. This 
allowed irrelevant matter into the hearing which was prejudicial 
to the outcome. 
Prior to the prehearing conference referred to abovef 
counsel for Mr. Tolman submitted a statement of issues by grievant, 
Exhibit "C" which contained a brief discussion of the concept of 
nexus in the form of a motion to restrict the scope of the hearing. 
During the course of the hearing between November 5 and November 
19, 1986, counsel for Mr. Tolman submitted, by way of trial brief, 
legal authority on the issue of nexus in support of various motions 
and objections made regarding the admission of evidence of off-
duty conduct, Exhibit "C". At the conclusion of the hearing, 
counsel for Mr. Tolman submitted a memorandum of law on or about 
November 19, 1986 dealing in great detail with the issue of nexus 
and other dispositive issues. Despite repeated reference to the 
legal issue of nexus before, during and after the termination 
hearing, the CSC based its final decision a large part upon 
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information that should have been excluded from the hearing had a 
proper ruling on the nexus motions been made. See, for example, 
Finding of Fact 3, 4, 5, 6, and Conclusions of Law. 
It is well settled that in adjudication of an employee's 
appeal from an adverse action such as termination requires at least 
two determinations by the trier of fact: First, whether the 
alleged conduct has, in fact, taken place; second, whether the 
action taken by the agency, in this case termination, promotes the 
efficiency of the service. See, Danesev v. Internal Revenue 
Service, DA 07528090242 (1982); A Guide to Merit Systems Protection 
Board Law and Practice, by Peter B. Broida, Section Edition, 1985, 
Dewey Publications, Inc., Washington, D.C., Page 282 (hereinafter 
referred to as "Broida"). The first requirement is a factual 
determination subject to proof by a preponderance of the evidence; 
the second element of the formulation is referred to as nexus. 
A determination of nexus is necessary in all termination 
cases, not only those involving off-duty conduct. See, Risner v. 
Federal Aviation Administration, 7 M.S.P.B. 342 (1981); Parsons v. 
Department of Air Force, 707 F.2d 1406 (DC Cir. 1983). In Parsons, 
the employee was fired for being AWOL and submitting a false sick 
leave request. The court held that in an agency removal action 
based upon misconduct, the agency must make three determinations: 
(1) that the employee actually committed the alleged misconduct; 
(2) that there is a sufficient nexus between the misconduct and the 
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efficiency of the service to sustain the adverse action; and (3) 
that the penalty imposed has been appropriately chosen for the 
specific misconduct involved. The agency has the burden of 
persuasion regarding these three elements of its decision and is 
therefor obligated to present evidence to the Board necessary to 
support each element. 
Although the above citations relate to cases before the 
Federal Merit Systems Protection Board, it is clear that the same 
standard must apply in matters before the CSC. Policy No. 5715 of 
the Salt Lake County Policies and Procedures establishes the same 
nexus requirement is required under the Federal Merit Systems 
Protection Board. Policy No. 5715(1.0) states that "Dismissals, 
demotions, reduction in pay or suspension shall only be to advance 
the good of the public service," which is the equivalent to the 
"efficiency of the agency language" underlying the nexus rule on 
the federal level. In other words, if an act has no effect on the 
agency or in any way detracts from the good of the public interest, 
it cannot support a termination. 
In Norton v. Macey, 417 F.2d 1161, 1165 (D.C. Cir. 1969), 
the D.C. Circuit held that immoral or indecent activity by an 
employee can only be considered to support a dismissal only if the 
activity has some ascertainable effect on the efficiency of the 
service. The court further stated that a reviewing court must at 
least be able to discern some specific connection between the 
30 
employee's potentially embarrassing activity and the efficiency of 
the service. 
Another court discounted the idea that "trust" alone 
should be a sufficient basis to dismiss an employee for off-duty 
conduct related to on-duty responsibilities. In Gloster v. General 
Services Administration, 720 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1983), the court 
held: 
The position of trust theory seems to posit that 
past offenses may render one unworthy of government 
service regardless of the effect, or lack of effect, on 
the functioning of the agency. This theory is, however, 
contrary to the theory of the Civil Service Reform Act 
that disciplinary actions may be taken only in the 
service of efficiency. A federal government and society 
in general certainly do not condone welfare fraud, but 
punishment for such offenses is entrusted by the Act to 
the criminal process so long as the offense has no work 
related effects. 
We are faced with a similar situation in this case. Mr. 
Tolman's conduct related to a matter totally distinct from his work 
responsibilities. In regard to the Margo Bergvall, Mr. Tolman 
engaged in a private act which was nothing more or less than a 
domestic dispute. The fact that Mr. Tolman is a sworn peace 
officer is incidental to the events that occurred on June 10 and 
11, 1986. That incident was a fight between former lovers and not 
between a peace officer and a member of the public. 
The CAO is not entitled to any presumption here that 
would ordinarily arise from very serious off-duty misconduct. 
Consequently, the CAO must bear the burden of proving by the proper 
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standard that the efficiency of the service is going to be 
impaired. Broida at 284. 
The leading nexus case is Merritt v. Department of 
Justice, 6 M.S.P.B. 493 (1981), involving a bureau of prison's 
correctional officer removed from his position for using and 
sharing with friends at home a small quantity of marijuana. The 
board held: 
A nexus determination must be based on evidence 
linking the employee's off-duty misconduct with the 
efficiency of the service, or in certain circumstances, 
on a presumption of nexus which may arise from the nature 
and gravity of the misconduct. In the latter situation, 
the presumption may be overcome by evidence of showing 
an absence of adverse effect on service efficiency, in 
which case the agency may no longer rely solely on the 
presumption, but must present evidence to carry its 
burden of proving nexus. The quantity and quality of the 
evidence which the agency need present in that 
circumstance would clearly then depend on the nature and 
gravity of the particular misconduct as well as upon the 
strength of the showing made by the appellant in 
overcoming the otherwise applicable presumption. 
The board in Merritt went on to hold that in most cases 
of even clearly criminal conduct, the establishment of nexus need 
not and should not depend upon a mere assertion or speculation. 
Nexus may not be presumed on the basis of a criminal conviction 
alone without consideration of the character and seriousness of 
the offense. The board observed that in only two judicial cases 
had a presumption of nexus been made: (1) a criminal conviction 
of killing an individual without necessity, and (2) a particularly 
repellant act of child molestation without a criminal conviction. 
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In Merritt, the board found no nexus established relative 
to the appellant, since there was no logical basis upon which to 
believe that for using a small amount of marijuana at his home, the 
appellant would be more likely to break the employer's rules 
against introduction of contraband into the prison compound. His 
performance was excellent on the job; there was no evidence 
suggesting that the appellant might be a victim of possible 
pressures and blackmail as a result of his activities. The fact 
that the appellant's conduct may have been unlawful did not relieve 
the agency of its burden to establish the requisite nexus, 
particularly in view of limitations on the power of the government 
to intrude unnecessarily upon the discreet conduct of citizens, 
including federal employees, in the privacy of their homes. 
The present case closely parallels the rationale of the 
Merritt case and provides an excellent example of a case in which 
there is no nexus between the off-duty conduct and the efficiency 
of the service. The notice of termination received by Mr. Tolman 
contained broadly sweeping allegation that his behavior was 
inimical to public service. There was no connection between a 
possible lapse of judgment in a moment of emotional weakness in an 
intimate private setting, such as occurred in the Tolman case, and 
the necessary exercise of caution and judgment in his position as 
an investigator for CAO. There is no connection between any of the 
misconduct alleged by the agency and Mr. Tolman's ability to 
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faithfully and fully perform the responsibilities of his position. 
There is no rational connection between his alleged outburst at 
Margo Bergvall and the likelihood that he would fail to assiduously 
carry out the responsibilities of an investigator in the County 
Attorney's office. Furthermore, Mr. Tolman presents an exemplary 
performance record. As in Merritt, there is no evidence in this 
case suggesting that Mr. Tolman would be the victim of possible 
pressure and blackmail as a result of his activities. In short, 
the CAO may not make a bald assertion of acts inimical to public 
service and use that to support the termination of a long term, 
faithful, valuable servant of Salt Lake County. 
There can be no question that there is no basis to employ 
presumption of nexus in this case. There was no conviction of any 
crime, nor was there any charge brought for criminal violation 
relevant to the allegations supporting termination. The acts 
alleged here occurred during off-duty hours and did not involve the 
use of any employer property or instrumentality; thus, there can 
be no argument that there is a reasonable fear of a recurrence of 
the alleged acts and any effect that this may have on the agency's 
mission to carry out its public responsibilities and dealings with 
the public. 
Furthermore, the discipline that was imposed is the 
harshest form of discipline available in an administrative setting. 
It is the administrative counter part of a death sentence in the 
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criminal context. The agency must have an increasingly greater 
burden of proof and persuasion when the penalty assessed is of this 
magnitude. 
The CAO attempted to show that it had been tarnished in 
the public eye by Tolman's actions. However the record shows how 
low the CAO's public image was prior to any acts by Tolman. The 
numerous scandals mentioned above make it nearly impossible for 
the CAO to claim harm to its image. 
A perusal of the cases dealing with law enforcement 
officers and alleged off-duty misconduct fails to reveal a single 
case in which a penalty as substantial as termination has been 
sustained on a showing of nexus between peace officer duties and 
an infraction as minor as that alleged in this case. See Broida, 
at Pages 303 and 304. In this case, there is no logical connection 
between the fact that Mr. Tolman is a sworn peace officer and 
alleged misconduct. 
The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Decision 
from the CSC contain no specific finding of fact relating to the 
issue of nexus. There is no mention of an impairment of the agency 
mission of the County Attorney's office attributable to any conduct 
by Mr. Tolman. The only reference to a connection between off-
duty conduct and Mr. Tolman's official responsibilities was that 
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in Finding of the Fact No. 6 dealing with poor judgment.3 The lack 
of a specific finding of fact and related conclusion of law is 
independent legal justification for a reversal of the CSC decision 
in this matter. Of late, the Utah Supreme Court has been very 
insistent that final orders be based upon adequate findings of fact 
and conclusions of law. The findings and conclusions in the 
hearing below are so sketchy as to be worthless on review. This 
alone justifies reversal or remand. 
The only conclusion that can be drawn from the foregoing 
discussion is that there is no reasonable nexus between the alleged 
events and the agency efficiency in this case. Any connection that 
the agency tries to draw is merely coincidental and has nothing to 
do with the substance of the alleged events. Consequently, the 
agency cannot support its burden of proof in this matter and any 
imposition of penalty by the agency and sustaining of that penalty 
by the CSC is reversible error. 
In the Muskegon Heights Police Department cited at 88 LA 
675 (BNA), facts very similar to those in this case lead to a 
3
 Finding of Fact No. 8 contains an oblique, hypothetical 
reference to discredit and disfavor arising from the incident 
between Mr. Tolman and John Harrington, the reporter. A review of 
the record indicates clearly, however, that Mr. Harrington 
testified on behalf of Mr. Tolman in the termination proceeding 
and indicated that Harrington was as much to blame for any 
disagreement as Mr. Tolman was. Furthermore, there is no evidence 
in the record to support a conclusion that the Tolman/Harrington 
incident brought any discredit or disfavor on the CAO. 
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determination of no nexus and reinstatement. In that case, a 
police officer was terminated for conduct unbecoming a police 
officer for reasons of off duty misconduct. The officer had an 
on-going romantic involvement with a woman whom he caught making 
love to another man. The police officer forced his way into the 
home, beat the woman, abducted her from her home, and forced her 
to have sex with him. He was charged criminally and ultimately 
acquitted. The terminating agency alleged that the status of the 
grievant as a peace officer constituted sufficient nexus to sustain 
termination for off-duty behavior. 
The hearing officer determined that to justify termina-
tion of the grievant's employment the agency must establish a nexus 
between the off-duty conduct and his on-the-job responsibilities. 
The hearing officer ruled that the grievant did not use his status 
as a police officer in any manner. Even though the grievant did 
have his service revolver during the altercation, he did not use 
it to force the lover to leave the ex-wife's premises. The mis-
treatment was in no way associated with the grievant's status as 
a police officer. His actions were entirely personal. There was 
no indication that the grievant was prone to this type of behavior 
while performing his law enforcement duties. The hearing officer 
found the grievant status as a police officer not establish in 
nexus between the investigation of the altercation and the subse-
quent prosecution on criminal charges. Moreover, the fact that the 
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grievant was found "not guilty" vindicated the grievant, vis-a-
vis the off-duty conduct. "Otherwise a police officer's employment 
will be severely jeopardized based on an allegation of wrong doing. 
. . . This record does not support an inference that the grievant is 
unable to function as a police officer." Id. at 679. The ultimate 
ruling, based upon facts very similar to the Tolman case, was that 
despite the existence of a peace officer status and despite the 
allegations of off-duty misconduct and the possibility of adverse 
publicity to the terminating agency, there was no establishment of 
nexus sufficient to support a termination of employment. That case 
was essentially a private dispute which became "public" by virtue 
of police and prosecutorial intervention. The same elements per-
tain to the Tolman case and support a reversal of the CSC decision. 
POINT IV: THE CSC FAILED TO CONSIDER MITIGATION OF PENALTIES 
If the court decides that there has been an adequate 
showing of justification for the imposition of a penalty in this 
case, it is reasonable for the court to conclude that the penalty 
of termination should be mitigated downward substantially. The 
burden on the CAO to persuade the court of the propriety of the 
penalty imposed, including the burden of establishing by a 
preponderance of the evidence any conclusions of fact upon which 
the particular sanction rests. Malinconico v. U.S. Postal Service, 
N.Y.O. 7528119213 (1983). In the case of Douglas v. Veterans' 
Administration, 5 M.S.P.B. 313 (1981), the following factors were 
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enumerated by the Merit Systems Protection Board as relevant 
considerations in a determination of discipline in a particular 
case: 
1. The nature and seriousness of the offense, and its 
relation to the employee's duties, position, and responsibilities, 
including whether the offense was intentional or technical or 
inadvertent or was committed maliciously or for gain, or was 
frequently repeated; 
2. The employee's job level and type of employment, 
including supervisory or fiduciary role, contacts with the public, 
and prominence of the position; 
3. The employee's past disciplinary record; 
4. The employee's past work record, including length 
of service, performance on the job, ability to get along with 
fellow workers, and dependable; 
5. The effect of the offense upon the employee's 
ability to perform at a satisfactory level and its effect on 
supervisor's confidence in the employee's ability to perform 
assigned duties; 
6. Consistency of the penalty with those imposed on 
other employees for the same or similar offenses; 
7. Consistency of the penalty with the applicable 
agency table of penalties; 
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8. The notoriety of the offense or its impact upon the 
reputation of the agency; 
9. The clarity with which the employee was on notice 
of any rules that were violated in committing the offense, or had 
been warned about the conduct in question; 
10• Potential for employee's rehabilitation; 
11. Mitigating circumstances surrounding the offense 
such as unusual job tensions, personality problems, mental 
impairment, harassment, or bad faith, malice or provocation on the 
part of others involved in the matter; and 
12. The adequacy and effectiveness of alternative 
sanctions to deter such conduct in the future by the employee or 
others. 
In applying these factors to the facts of the case at 
hand, it must first be born in mind that the CAO has gone to great 
lengths in this case to create a case to support the termination 
of Mr. Tolman.4 None of the individual incidents, even if 
completely true and even if directly related to Mr. Tolman's 
ability to perform his work responsibilities, would be sufficient 
to support a termination. 
The only allegation against Mr. Tolman that has any 
direct bearing upon his job responsibilities was the claim of 
4
 Prior to the hearing it was the opinion of counsel for the 
CAO that the CAO could not win the case. See Exhibit "D". 
40 
personal use of a company vehicle. Under the policies and 
procedures of the CAO, the investigators were entitled to use their 
company vehicles for incidental personal use despite the overall 
policy against unlimited personal use. There was no showing in 
this instance that Mr. Tolman's personal use of the company car was 
in violation of the incidental use policy. Furthermore, this was 
a very minor allegation, even if it was proven to be true, which 
has very little relation to Mr. Tolman's duties, position and 
responsibilities. Furthermore, that allegation was the subject of 
complete discussion and was resolved between the parties. The 
agency tried to raise it a second time which it cannot do as 
discussed in the section on double jeopardy. 
The rest of the allegations against Mr. Tolman fell into 
the category of being alcohol related off-duty conduct, the John 
Harrington incident and the Margo Bergvall incident. the John 
Harrington incident was adequately dealt with at the time and was 
raised again for a second go around of penalty in violation of the 
double jeopardy rule. The Margo Bergvall incident was an off-duty 
domestic fight that had no bearing upon Mr. Tolman's ability to do 
his job. The alcohol related incidents all fell in the category 
of alcoholism which has been recognized in Salt Lake County as a 
handicap. It was shown in the hearing that Salt Lake County had 
an employee resource program which supervisors are trained to use. 
In this case, the agency had simply chosen not to make a referral 
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because it would interfere with their primary motive of terminating 
Ralph Tolman rather than trying to seek his rehabilitation. This 
was a direct violation of Mr. Tolman's rights and cannot support 
the termination. 
Mr. Tolman was an investigator with no supervisory or 
fiduciary responsibilities. He did have contact with the public. 
However, the position he had is not prominent outside the context 
of the scandals that surrounded the CAO. 
Mr. Tolman had been disciplined in the past. However, 
it had been done in a very haphazard manner and had not been done 
in a way that would have put him on adequate notice that a DUI 
arrest or an off-duty domestic dispute would cause his immediate 
termination. Furthermore, there had been no showing that Mr. 
Tolman's disciplinary record was out of the ordinary for 
investigators in the CAO. 
Mr. Tolman's past work record was exemplary. He had been 
employed since 1971 in the capacity of law enforcement. He had 
been singled out for commendation for his performance of his job. 
There was repeated testimony that his ability to get along with his 
fellow workers and dependability was first rate. There had been 
no criticism leveled at Mr. Tolman's ability to perform his job. 
There was no testimony placed on the record relating to 
the effect of the alleged offenses upon Mr. Tolman's ability to 
perform at a satisfactory level other than that mentioned above and 
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the effect of the alleged offenses upon his supervisor's confidence 
in his ability to perform his duties. No one has testified 
directly on this point. Those witnesses who would have been 
confident to testify in this regard did not and even had they done 
so, their testimony would have been self-serving because they are 
the ones who put together the case against Mr. Tolman and put their 
reputations on the line to support the termination effort. The 
only independent statements of Mr. Tolman's ability to perform his 
job duties came from his co-workers who all testified, without 
exception, that their ability to perform with him in the future 
would not be impaired by the allegations that had been made against 
him. 
There was no extensive testimony that Mr. Tolman had been 
singled out in regard to the penalty that the agency had chosen to 
impose for these offenses. Other members of the CAO staff have 
been arrested for DUI offenses in the past and have not been 
terminated. In fact, other members of the CAO staff and other 
agencies in Salt Lake City and Salt Lake County have been 
repeatedly arrested for DUI and have not lost their employment as 
a result. This is illustrative of a fact that should be recognized 
by the CAO in this case: An off-duty DUI arrest which did not 
result in a conviction, did not have any bearing upon the 
employee's ability to do his hob. That was the relevant 
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consideration and that issue was shown to be decisively in Mr. 
Tolman's favor. 
The offense of which Mr. Tolman was accused had received 
some notoriety in the press. It should be born in mind that the 
notoriety arose from press releases made by the CAO or responses 
made by the CAO representatives to press inquiries. The DUI arrest 
alone would not have raised any concern in the media. The reason 
it received as broad dissemination as it did was because of the 
other scandals emanating from the CAO in which Mr. Tolman 
innocently played a part. Independent of those other scandals, 
this incident would never have received the attention that it did. 
Mr. Tolman was not responsible in any way for the dissemination of 
any information that would have been harmful to the CAO. 
It was shown throughout the hearing that the CAO is very 
lax in its creation and preservation of written records of 
disciplinary actions. It was also shown that the CAO is very lax 
in the dissemination of policies and procedures. Mr. Tolman 
learned of the proposed discipline for the personal use of county 
vehicles for the first time in the context of his termination. He 
also learned for the first time that the CAO intended to terminate 
people for being arrested for DUI in the context of his termination 
proceeding. That illustrated there was very little clarity on 
which Tolman could rely to give him notice of rules and 
regulations. Tolman had a constitutionally protected interest in 
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his continued employment. That could not be taken lightly and 
could not be taken away on the flimsy case put together by the CAO. 
Any doubt as to the sufficiency of notice and fairness of 
proceedings had to be decided in favor of the employee in light of 
this constitutionally protected property interest. 
Mr. Tolman deserved an attempt to rehabilitate himself 
in relation to his alcoholism. The county created an affirmative 
obligation on the part of the CAO to make referrals to the County 
Employee Resource Program specifically for the purpose of 
rehabilitation. That is a duty owed by the CAO to Mr. Tolman which 
was breached in this case. To make matters worse, the CAO had 
tried to turn these alcohol related incidents into the basis for 
termination without having first carried out its affirmative duty 
to make the county's resources for rehabilitation available to Mr. 
Tolman. 
There were a number of mitigating circumstances 
surrounding the alleged offenses which should have been taken into 
consideration. Perhaps the most inflammatory accusation made 
against Mr. Tolman was the incident involving Margo Bergvall. It 
should have been noted that this incident occurred at a point of 
breakup of a twelve year relationship during which Mr. Tolman lived 
with Ms. Bergvall. After twelve years of a relationship of this 
nature, it should be understandable that there would be extreme 
emotional distress if one were to find his or her lover in the arms 
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of another person. That have been taken into consideration when 
judging Mr. Tolman's actions. Until recently, many states in the 
United States would have allowed a person to plead this type of 
emotional distress as a defense for homicide. If it constitutes 
a defense for a capital crime, it should certainly have had some 
bearing upon the consideration of mitigation in the context of a 
termination hearing. 
It was also relevant to consider Tolman's personality 
and training. The county, through the sheriff's office and the 
CAO, made Tolman the type of person he was. They paid him to 
drink; they encouraged him to infiltrate criminal elements; they 
supported him when he acted aggressively, and they commended him 
for doing all of these things in a very stressful work environment. 
The training and experience lead to Mr. Tolman's alcoholism. To 
a large extent, the county was responsible for the alleged behavior 
they then used against Mr. Tolman. 
Furthermore, there was no doubt that the CAO had been 
embroiled in one scandal after another. It was no secret that Mr. 
Tolman had been singled out by his superiors because of the role 
that he had played in at least one of those scandals. A review of 
the press at that time indicates that Mr. Tolman had consistently 
been forthcoming with information in the various investigations 
surrounding those scandals. There was live testimony in the 
hearing indicating that Mr. Tolman's superiors resented him for 
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being honest and for embarrassing the office because of his 
honesty. If that was not enough to entirely exonerate Mr. Tolman 
under the circumstances, it certainly should have been enough to 
mitigate the penalty of termination substantially downward. This 
court should not allow the CAO to discard a man after it made him 
into the type of man he was. Mr. Tolman only asks that he be given 
fair treatment in consideration of the matter. 
POINT V: THE COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE MAY NOT IMPOSE 
DOUBLE JEOPARDY FOR EVENTS WHICH WERE THE 
SUBJECT OF FORMER DISCIPLINE 
Both the personal use of a county car issue and the 
incident with John Harrington were the subjects of former 
discipline and should not have been re-punished. It was revealed 
in the hearing, that Mr. Tolman received "discipline" for the 
personal mileage issue. Even though Mr. Tolman, Jim Burns and 
Casey Romijn all recalled that the issue was settled in a meeting 
attended by Mr. Tolman, Mr. Romijn and Don Harmon, the agency 
maintained that it, in fact, imposed a probation on Mr. Tolman as 
discipline for the event. It was further brought out in the 
hearing that Mr. Tolman was disciplined for the Harrington 
incident. It consisted only of a "reprimand." 
It has been consistently held that an agency may not 
punish an employee twice for the same misconduct. For example, in 
Burton v. Civil Service Commission, 394 N.E.2d 1168 (111. 1979), 
it was held that a civil service employee could not be suspended 
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for ten days and then later discharged for the same act of 
accepting a gratuity from a taxpayer. The court concluded that the 
initial ten-day suspension constituted the final disciplinary 
action and that to then impose discipline for the same event was 
double jeopardy. The agency was estopped from enhancing the 
severity of the original suspension. 
The court in Messina v. City of Chicago, 495 N.E.2d 1228 
(111. 1986), discussed the Burton case and provided an extensive 
treatment of the issue of double jeopardy in administrative law and 
labor arbitration. The following excerpt is given to illustrate: 
The so-called double jeopardy rule preventing 
imposition by management of more than one penalty for a 
single offense is not seriously questioned in any 
arbitral authority. It is a salutory and necessary rule 
going to the very heart of due process and fundamental 
fairness. If a second penalty may be invoked for one 
offense, why not a third and where and when will it stop? 
The worker is entitled to know his case is determined and 
settled and that further discipline will be applied only 
if he errs anew. (Citing 67 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 1313, 1314). 
See also. Auburn Faith Community Hospital, Inc. v. 
California Nurses Association, 66 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 882, 893 (Killion 
Arb. 1976) ("It is now an established tenet of industrial 
jurisprudence that one a penalty has been assessed and accepted, 
it cannot be increased. This principle is based on concepts of 
double jeopardy borrowed from the criminal law and on those of due 
process and fair play. Once management has assessed a penalty, it 
does not get a second go at the employee for the same infraction, 
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when, upon review, higher management deems the first penalty 
inadequate."); Wolverine World Wide, Inc. v. Amalgamated Meat 
Cutters Local 600, 66 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 796, 799 (Herman Arb. 1976); 
Stauffer Chemical Co. v. International Union of Operating 
Engineers, Local 912, 59 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 414, 416 (Davis Arb. 1975) 
("This principle [against double jeopardy] is so well-known and so 
well-established as not to require specific explanation."); Ashland 
Oil & Refining Co. v. Oil, Chemical & Atomic Workers International 
Union, Local 11-420, 28 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 874, 878 (Bradley Arb. 
1957) ("Disciplinary action to be effective should be prompt and 
positive."); Michigan Seamless Tube Co. v. United Steelworkers of 
America, Local 1900, 24 Lab. Arb. (BNA) 132, 134 (Ryder Arb. 1955); 
Durham Hosiery Mills v. American Federation of Hosiery Workers, 
Branch 31-A, 24 Lab. Arb. 356, 358 (Livengood Arb. 1955); John 
Deere Tractor Co. v. United Automobile, Aircraft & Agricultural 
Implement Workers of America, Local 838, 12 Lab. Arb. 129, 131 
(Updegraff Arb. 1949) ("Much has been written concerning [double 
jeopardy as] a concession to the widespread basic feeling that 
after one punishment has been imposed or even after there has been 
one opportunity for punishment, further punishment or efforts to 
impose penalties are oppressive, unfair, and unjust.") 
There is a constant theme running through these cases: 
Management had an opportunity to assess timely and appropriate 
discipline (and in some instances did) but attempted to resurrect 
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old misconduct as a ground for new discipline. This has been 
consistently rejected by the courts and labor arbitrators. The 
same theme is present in this case. The CAO has gone back more 
than five years to dredge up every bit of dirt it could against 
Ralph Tolman. It asks the court to go against the wisdom of 
decades of precedent to uphold termination on the sheer weight of 
all of these allegations, regardless of when they occurred and what 
had been done at the time to impose discipline or to excuse the 
conduct. 
Tolman asks that the relevant time frame for the 
presentation of evidence be limited. Tolman asserts that what 
occurred in the past and was either made the subject of prior 
disciplinary actions or excused and condoned through above-
standard and standard performance evaluations was irrelevant to the 
hearing. 
Double jeopardy was not just some slick argument brought 
up at the CSC hearing in an attempt to protect Mr. Tolman. It was 
a manifestation of substantive and procedural due process. Mr. 
Tolman should not have been punished for conduct that was 
disciplined, excused, or ignored in the past. 
CONCLUSION 
The hearing was so flawed due to failure to rule on 
essential motions, improper rulings, admission of prejudicial 
hearsay, allowing witnesses to testify on behalf of other 
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witnesses, failure to exclude information not disclosed in 
discovery, and allowing an armed guard to be present in the 
hearing, as to constitute a deprivation of Tolman's procedural due 
process. 
Irrelevant material which should not have been admitted 
over objections based on the nexus rule significantly shaped the 
course and outcome of the hearing. 
Tolman was charged with stale charges and subjected to 
double jeopardy. He was the target of a political vendetta. He 
was the victim of crass manipulation of the County merit rules. 
He was singled out for termination because of his forthright stand 
on issues of corruption in the CAO. 
Pursuant to Section 63-46b-16(4)(c), (d), (e), and 
(h)(iii) of the Utah Code Annotated, this court should reverse the 
judgment of the CSC and the district court. Not all issues 
requiring resolution were decided; law has been erroneously 
interpreted and applied; there has been a failure to follow 
prescribed procedure, and the decision to terminate Tolman was 
contrary to the CSC's prior practice without a fair and rational 
basis. 
For all these reasons, based upon questions of law, 
Tolman should be reinstated to his former position with full 
restitution of backpay and benefits. 
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DATED this <fa day of July, 1990. 
L. ZANE GILL, P.C. 
L.' Zan/e Gill 
Attorrley for Appellant 
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52 
ADDENDUM 
Appellant's Exhibit "A" 
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T.L. "TED" CANNON 
County Attorney 
MICHAEL N. MARTINEZ 
Ch»#< Oeouiy County Attorney 
September 8, 1986 
Ralph Tolman 
Salt Lake County Attorney's 
Office 
231 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
SUBJECT: Notice of intent to terminate. 
Dear Ralph: 
This letter is to inform you rhat pursuant to Sections 
17-33-5(3)(p) 1733-7(2)(e) and 17-33-10. U.C.A. (1953 as 
amended), and Salt Lake County Policy 5715, I am terminating 
your employment with the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office 
effective September 19, 1986. Your last working day at the 
office will be September 19, 1986. 
This decision-is based upon your continuing misconduct 
and acts inimical to public service; i.e., your D.U.I. arrests 
and other incidences which reflect poorly upon this office, 
tarnishes the image thereof, and you have failed to obey 
reasonable orders of your supervisor. Because of your 
inappropriate behavior, this office is left with no alternative 
but to terminate your employment. Additionally, your acts 
reflect an emotional instability which not only present a 
danger to the citizens of Salt Lake County but places your 
status of a police officer in jeopardy. 
are as 
The specific 
follows: 
incidences on which this office relies 
1. On June 5, 1981, you were arrested by the Utah 
Highway Patrol for driving under the influence of alcohol. You 
subseguently pled guilty to a lesser included offense of 
reckless driving. You were verbally warned and given five days 
suspension by Don Sawaya, Chief Deputy of the Recovery 
Division, with the admonishment that any further acts of this 
amtntstrntion 
•oger A. Livingston 
**uet Deoutv Countv Artornev 
-*' 4oT>ir>tMrative Affairs 
231 East 4th South Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 (801) 363-7900 
C County Attorney Victim Services 
Julie Branch 
Director 
4tr\ Floor 
C Justice Division 
Waiter R Ellen 
Chie! Deouty 
3rc Floor 
D Investigative Agency 
Don Harman 
Soeciai Agent in Charge 
4th Floor" 
O Civil Division 
William R. Hyde 
Chief Deputy 
2nd Floor 
C Government; 
Donald Saw* 
Chiet DeoutN 
2nd Floor 
Ralph Tolman 
September 8, 1986 
Page 2 
nature would result in your termination. (See attached memos 
of D.U.I, charges marked as Attachment 1). 
2. In 1984 you were apprehended by the Midvale Police 
after you and your wife left the Sage Lounge. Sergeant Tim 
Short of the Midvale Police Department determined that you were 
too intoxicated to drive. Because of your position with this 
office, you were not arrested but allowed the opportunity to 
find another way home. 
3. On August 18 of this year, you were arrested by a 
Salt Lake City police officer for running a red light and 
Driving under the Influence. Your breathalizer test showed a 
.15 percent alcohol content. (See attached copies of police 
report marked as Attachment 2). Certainly three D.U.I, 
offenses within six years demonstrates poor judgment by a 
police officer who is Bworn to obey the law. 
4. On June 10, 1986, you assaulted and battered Margo 
Bergwall. This office recognizes that relationships develop 
between adults, but your .actions in regards to Ms. Bergwall 
demonstrate ..an inability .to control your emotions. Clearly 
this office cannot tolerate your intimidations and threats made 
to Ms. Bergwall and her acquaintances. 
5. In a nemo .of January 1986, you and the other 
investigators were directed that County Attorney vehicles were 
not to be used for personal use or on the weekends. Your 
obvious disobedience of this directive has • been documented by 
Don Harmon, who checked your mileage on two different 
occasions. Furthermore, you were observed on August 9, 1986 at 
Ms. Bergwall's residence in a County Attorney's Office 
vehicle. (See attached memos dated February 5, 1986 from Lt. 
Sam Dawson, and memo dated February 4, 1986 marked as 
Attachment 3). 
6. Your confrontation with John Harrington on October 
8, 1985 again demonstrates poor judgment by an investigator of 
this office. (See attached memo marked as Attachment 4). 
7. In September of 1982, you lied to your immediate 
supervisor concerning the transportation of a witness. Clearly 
this office must trust its employees to be truthful and this 
applies even more to one who is a sworn peace officer. (See 
attached memos marked as Attachment 5). 
It is for the above stated reasons that it is this 
office's decision to terminate your employment. You have the 
right to have a pretermination hearing to present any 
mitigating factor in your favor. Said hearing will be held 10 
o'clock Friday, September 12, 1986. In the event that your 
Ralph Tolman 
September Q , 1986 
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explanations do not mitigate the above charges, your 
termination will be effective on the date first above written. 
Please find attached a copy of Salt Lake County Policy 
5705, entitled Grievance Procedure. -This action will be heard 
at the department review level. 
Sincerely. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY 
"T. L. "Ted" Cannon 
(0923J) 
•(<-V / L ' 
BEFORE THE SALT LAKE COUNTY 
CAREER SERVICE COUNCIL 
H 
IN RE: AoDeal of : F i r UL 
RALPH TOLMAN COIN *<S ' 
: ANE 
: C a s e N O . 66—15 
This matter came on for near1no Defore tne Salt Lane Countv 
Career Service Council on November 5. 1966 ana conduced on 
Novemoer 19, 1966. Council mernoers. Snerri R. Guyon, Wiliard 
J. Homer, and Rooert S. Adams were present. Appellant. Raloh 
To1wan, was present and reoresented by his counsel L. Zane Gill, 
attorney for tne Utah Public Employee1s Association. The Bait 
Lake County Attorney's Office was reoresentea Dv Don Sawava. as 
Deoartment representative, AT\Q Jerry Camppell, Deputy County 
Attorney. Testimony was given, facts were aaduced. exhibits were 
receivea, and otherwise being fully aDorised in tne matter, the 
Council nereoy enters its Fincinos of Fact, Conclusions of Law. 
and Decision. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Tne Appellant. Ralon To1 man. w*s hired as an Investi-
cat or for tne Salt Lane County flttornev's Orfice on April 1. 
I960. 
£. Tnat the responsibilities ana outies of an InvestIcator 
were tne same resoonsioi1itles anc outies as a law enforcement 
officer in the State of Utan and tnat tne position of Salt L.ake 
County Investigator reauirea peace officer certification. 
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3. Tnat on tne earlv morning nours of June 5, 19B1, RalDh 
Tolman. wno was not on auty with tne Salt Lake County Attorney's 
Office, was arrestee bv tne Utan Highway Patrol for orivino unaer 
the influence of alcohol. far. Tolman had been driving a Salt 
Lake County Attorney's Office vehicle and had a firearm in the 
gloveoox. Mr. Tolman was verDally warned and oiven five aavs 
suspension DV tne Salt Lake County Attorney's Office after he nad 
plead guilty to a lessor offense of reckless driving. 
4. In 19S3 or 1984, Ralon Tolman was oDservea by two 
Officers of tne Midvale Police Department exiting the Sane 
Lounge. One of the officers testifiea tnat ne oDvtrved 
mr. Tolman stagger towaros a vehicle. enter the vehicle, txriQ 
start its engine, wnereuoon they Dlocked the vehicle from leaving 
the area. The other officer testified that he saw Mr. Tolman 
exit tne Lounge and that ne saw tne brake liants of Mr. Tolman's 
vehicle. 
This Council oelieves tne Officer'-* version of tn» events at 
the Sage Lounge when they maicated RalDh Tolman was in fact 
behind tne wneel of the venicle ana was attempting to leave. 
This Council further believes tne Officer's version that 
Mr. Tolman was in fact intoxicated from aiconol and tnat nao he 
not Deen an Investlpator for Salt LaK.e County, ne would nave Deen 
arrested by tne Officers of Midvale. 
5. On Aucust IB, 1966, Mr. Tolman was arrested for crivinc 
unaer tne influence of aiconol at aooroxirnateiv l7tn Soutn ana 
11th East. His blooa alcohol level was .152. Mr. Tolman 
admit tea tnat he haa alead guilty to an aiconol-reiated reckless 
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ariving offense. Tnis Council notes tnat on ftuqust 16, 1966, 
RalDh Toirnan was not on auty nor was he on duty in the incident 
at the Sage Lounge in Midvale. 
6. In regards to tne alienations of June 10, 1966, tnis 
Council fmas that Raloh Tolman did assault and batter a female 
acquaintance and her male friend at her home wmle Mr. Toirnan was 
off auty. However, on the aay of June 11, 1966, while RalDh 
Tolman was on auty, he entered hmr home and assaulted and 
battered her male friend. The facts were that RalDh Tolman was 
on his way to work on June 11, 1966, in a Salt Lake County 
Attorney's vehicle when he stopoed his car at the fernai© 
acauamtance* s house at aooroxlmately 6s0tf a. rn and enterea the 
norne. Tne Council fines tnat in reparas to this incident, 
Mr. Toirnan usee ooor judgment ana that his actions constituted' 
acts mimical to DUDIIC service. „ 
7. In January of 1966, RalDn Tolman and tne other Invest-
igators were instructed not to use their County vehicles for 
oersonal use. The facts were that RalDh Toirnan used his venicie 
on three seoarate occasions for his own oersonal use ana this was 
in violation of a direct oraer from a supervisor, a ciear act of 
msuDorcination. Notning was presented by the Appellant wnicn 
wouid mitigate his actions for disoaevmn a airect oraer. 
8. The Council further fines that Mr. Toirnan exhibitea 
very poor behavior wnen he launched a verbal attack anamst a 
local news reporter on October 6, 1S£5. Clearly. Raloh Tolman 
was the instigator of a very heatea argument. Tne Council finds 
that the location of the incident comoined with tne fact that a 
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well—known trial was Demnj neld in tne close Droxirnity demon-
strates not only a lack of pood judpment, but also constitutes 
acts tnat would bring discreait and disfavor to the County 
Attorney*« Office. The actions showed a lack of professionalism 
as a law enforcement officer. The Council notes that tne 
incident with the local news reporter occurred while Mr. Tolman 
was on duty and tnat the evioence was clear that Mr. Tolman had 
not been drinking, thus, alconol was not a contributing factor in 
the Appellant's behavior. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
This Council, will apply the law of the State of Utah as set 
forth in yetterl>(ii_v1 CiviX-§£CifiS§-.Q£rJl!2i&§i£D..£f-.Sajjt LsitSg^ Cix^ i 
145 P. £d 79£ (1945). This Council believes that the Respondent. 
Salt Lake County Attorney's Office, has satisfied the reouire-
ments of Vetterii in tnat (1) tne al legations against Ralph 
Tolrnan by the Salt Lake County Attorney1 s Office were not only, 
supoorted by the facts but that they *^ ere not controverted; (£> 
tne action taken, the termination of RalDh Tolman, was 
warranted. It is this Council's opinion that a law enforcement 
officer is held to a hioher standard of responsibility tnan tne 
averace citizen aric that tne nigner standard of duty is evident 
in tne Law Enforcement Cooe of Etnics wnerein it states in part 
that a police officer will keeo his private life unsullied as 
an examDle to all and tnat he will be exemplary in ooeying tne 
laws of the lano. 
This Council oelieves that tne actions by Mr, Tolman in 
regards to tne assault incident and tne vernal confrontation witn 
-5-
tne news reporter, in addition to tne DUI arrests, demonstrate 
very poor judgment Dy RalDn To1man and bnnos discredit to and 
tarnishes tne image of the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office. 
The totality of the allegations against RalDh Tolrnan 
demonstrated a pattern of conduct wnicn merited termination from 
the Salt Lake County Attorney's Office. His actions aid 
constitute acts inimical to tne Dublic service. Each alienation 
individually may not alone be sufficient to merit termination, 
but combined together, they oresent a pattern of misconduct DV 
the Appellant which warrants the action taken. 
The relationship between tne off-duty conduct and 
Mr. Tolrnan's position as a Salt Lake County Attorney Investinator 
was clear. Certainly, a police officer or County Attorney's 
Investigator has a higher duty to obey tne lawn than that of the 
Averagi citizen. Uftun off-dutv conduct is brought to the 
attention of the public which casts a Door imaoe upon PUPIIC 
service or in this case rhe Salt Lane County Attorney's Office, 
tne agency is justified in tne termination action. 
This Council is not persuaced nor oo we find any facts to 
support the contentions of tne Appellant that ne was terrninateo 
as a result of his political support of a local candiaate or tnat 
nis actions should be excused oecause ne nad consumed aiconoi. 
No facts were presented to snow tnat Ralpn Tolrnan was an 
alcoholic. 
In fact, the Council conduces tnat aiconoi • is not a 
contributing factor to Mr. Tolrnan's unprofessional conduct. Tnis 
conclusion is pasea upon comparing tne mcicent of tne veroal 
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excnange oetween Mr. To1man with tne news reoorter wnere the 
Appellant had not been Drinking to tne mciaents with the female 
acquaintance wnere he had been arinkinn, demonstrate lack of 
judgment and conduct unbecoming a police officer. 
DECISION 
This Council, therefore, unanimously finas that the 
Re5Donaerit' s allegations are suDportaole bv the facts and that 
the sanctions imposed of termination were warrantee. 
3 /uL day of DepefiTTSfe^ , 19S&. 
SHERRI R. GUYON/Cha*ir J3 (ftr^ 
' WILLARD J. HtTKiER/Vice-Chair 
ROBERTAS. "^AmS/NernDer **& 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I npreoy certify tnat I nave rnaiiea a true and exact coDy of 
the foregoing Finaings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Decision 
to Zane Gill, counsel for Appellant: Jerry CamDOeli, counsel for 
DeDartrnent, ana J- D. Johnson, Director of tne County nurnan 
Resources Division, this ^"^ day of December. 196£. 
•L. Zane Gill 
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH 
Attorneys for Grievant 
50 West Broadway, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone (801) 328-1666 
BEFORE THE SALT LAKE COUNTY 
CAREER SERVICE COUNCIL 
In the matter of the grievance of 
RALPH TOLMAN, 
Grievant, 
vs. 
SALT LAKE COUNTY ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, 
Respondent. 
STATEMENT OF 
ISSUES BY 
GRIEVANT 
Grievant, Ralph Tolman, submits this Statement of Issues 
by and through L. Zane Gill, attorney for the Utah Public 
Employees' Association. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Was Grievant terminated by the Salt Lake County 
Attorneyfs Office for just cause? 
ATTACH WCWT^-^ . 
BECBVEB 
OCT 22 1986 
COUNTY ATTCRNEv 
CIVIL DIVISION 
2. If not, what d i sc ip l ine , i f any, i s appropriate? 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Ralph Tolman has been an investigator in the Salt Lake 
County Attorneyfs office since January 25, 1971. During that 
time he has consistently received at least standard and above 
standard performance evaluations. A review of his personnel 
file shows that he has never received any documented discipline 
for anything. 
On about September 8, 1986, Mr. Tolman was informed by 
letter under the signature of former Salt Lake County Attorney 
Ted Cannon that his employment with Salt Lake County was being 
terminated for "acts inimical to public service." Mr. Tolman 
initiated this grievance and has timely processed all 
administrative steps leading to this appeal before the Career 
Service Council. 
A hearing was held by the department representative, C. 
Don Harmon, on about September 12, 1986. Mr. Tolman was not 
allowed to be represented by counsel at that hearing. Upon 
advice of counsel, Mr. Tolman attended but did not present 
testimony or evidence. The initial decision to terminate 
conveyed in the September 8, 1986 letter was upheld, and Mr. 
Tolman!s employment was terminated effective September 19, 1986. 
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The September 8, 1986 letter (the termination letter) 
listed seven incidents which were allegedly acts inimical to 
public service as contained in Salt Lake County Policies and 
Procedures (P&P) No. 5715. Each of those incidents is discussed 
below in conjunction with a brief discussion of why each is 
insufficient basis to support termination. 
BORDEN AND STANDARD OF PROOF 
This is a discipline-related personnel action. The 
agency bears the burden of proof on all matters. The proper 
standard of proof is preponderance of evidence or higher. The 
consequences to Mr. Tolman of being terminated for the acts 
alleged could include stigmatization in the public. This is 
particularly true due to the media attention already given to 
the events giving rise to this hearing. It is proper for the 
Career Service Council to apply a higher standard of proof due 
to the severity of stigmatization possible. 
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EXCLUSIONARY RULE 
The Career Service Council has the authority to exclude 
everyone from the hearing room not presently giving testimony. 
This must include the press as well. Mr. Tolman would ask that 
all witnesses be admonished against discussing their testimony 
with anyone else, including the press. 
ELEMENTS OF THE AGENCY'S BURDEN 
It is fundamental that three points must be proved by 
the agency to the required level of persuasion in order for it 
to prevail in this hearing: 
1) It must prove that the alleged acts 
inimical to public service actually occurred; 
2) It must prove that there is sufficient 
nexus between those acts and the efficiency 
of the service to sustain the termination; 
and 
3). It must prove that the penalty chosen for 
the alleged misconduct is appropriate. 
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See, Parsons v. Department of Air Force, 707F 2d 1406 
(D.C. Cir. 1983) [This case illustrates the nexus requirement in 
every adverse action case. It is the standard used in the 
Federal Merit System] 
Most of the acts mentioned in the termination letter are 
alleged to have occurred during off-duty hours. It is the 
burden of the agency to show convincingly that the alleged off-
duty acts affect the efficiency of the agency. It is not the 
province of the Career Service Council nor the agency to promote 
morality instead of efficiency. This is made clear by Judge 
Bazelon in Norton v. Macy, 417 F 2d 1161, 1165 (D.C. Cir. 1969): 
The notion that it could be an appropriate function of 
the federal bureaucracy to enforce the majorityfs 
conventional codes of conduct in the private lives of 
its employees is at war with elementary concepts of 
liberty, privacy, and diversity. 
A finding that an employee has done something immoral or 
indecent could'support a dismissal without further 
inquiry only-if*all immoral or indecent acts of an 
employee have some ascertainable deleterious effect on 
the efficiency of the service. 
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Thus, appellee is now obliged to rely solely on this 
possibility of embarrassment to the agency to justify 
appellant's dismissal. The assertion of such a nebulous 
"cause" poses perplexing problems for a review 
proceeding which must accord broad discretion to the 
Commission. . . . [I]f the possibility of such 
transitory institutional discomfiture must be 
uncritically accepted as a cause for discharge which 
will "promote the efficiency of the service," we might 
as well abandon all pretense that the statute provides 
any substantive security for its supposed beneficiaries. 
. . . A reviewing court must at least be able to discern 
some reasonably foreseeable, specific connection between 
an employee's potentially embarrassing conduct and the 
efficiency of the service. 
CONDONATION AND PERFORMANCE APPRAISALS 
Termination is the most drastic discipline available. 
It is the administrative equivalent of .the death penalty. It is 
inherent in basic concepts of due process that a merit covered 
employee be given fair notice of the potential for termination. 
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Where, as In this case, an employee is given periodic 
performance evaluations, it is the duty of the agency to 
indicate deficiencies in performance. If the employee is not 
informed that his actions could lead to his termination, it is 
not fair to suddenly tell him that his actions were, in fact, 
very detrimental to the agency and that he must now be fired. 
As recently as July 30, 1986, Mr. Tolman was told by his 
agency that his performance was above standard. Mr. Tolman 
received a merit pay increase on about that date. Two short 
months later Mr. Tolman was fired for acts dating back as far as 
five years. The Utah Personnel Review Board has recently ruled 
that where a performance evaluation did not mention acts which 
were later given as grounds for termination, those acts were 
irrelevant and deemed condoned or forgiven in a subsequent 
termination action. See, Grievance of Mildred Martinez v. 
Attorney General's Office, 5 P.R.B./H.O. 68, Order dated October 
16, 1986. 
The agency in this case should not be allowed to 
introduce evidence or raise charges predating.the July 30, 1986, 
performance appraisal. 
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PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE 
It is alleged that Mr. Tolman was arrested for DUI on 
August 18, 1986• To date Mr, Tolman has been convicted of 
nothing in regard to that event. Mr. Tolman is entitled by our 
Constitution to be considered innocent until proven guilty. Mr. 
Tolman also has a constitutionally protected property interest 
in his continued employment which cannot be taken from him 
without due process and equal protection of the law. He has 
already been fired for an unproved event. Mr. Tolman1s civil 
rights have already been violated. 
POLITICAL MOTIVATION 
As was stated in Mr. Tolman1s notice of grievance, his 
termination has been politically motivated. His evidence will 
show that because of his role in certain highly controversial 
and publicized cases involving the County Attorney's office he 
became the target of a long term, purposeful campaign to get rid 
of him. 
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SELECTIVE DISCIPLINE 
Other present and former employees of the County 
Attorney's office have been convicted of the same acts alleged 
against Mr. Tolman here. None of them was terminated for those 
acts. Mr. Tolman is entitled to equal treatment under the 
County merit system. 
PROGRESSIVE DISCIPLINE 
It is a terminating agency's affirmative obligation to 
take the least drastic steps to correct troublesome behavior. 
For most offenses, management is expected to use a 
system of progressive discipline under which the 
employee is warned or given disciplinary suspensions 
before being hit with the ultimate penalty of 
discharge. A common pattern is: oral warning, written 
warning, disciplinary layoff, and discharge. 
77 LA 207, 72 LA 1285., 72 LA 350, 60 LA 656. 
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SPECIFIC ALLEGATIONS 
1. Reckless driving on June 5, 1981. This was an off-
duty event which had no bearing at all on Mr. Tolman!s 
performance of his job duties. There was no suspension given. 
There was no written warning given. This event is too far in 
the past to be relevant even if it were work connected. Mr. 
Tolman has received regular standard and above evaluations 
including regular merit pay increases. No mention has been made 
of this event anywhere until now. 
2. Sage Lounge incident, 1983. This was an off-duty 
event which had no bearing at all on Mr. Tolmanfs performance of 
his job duties. No charges were ever brought, no arrest made. 
There was no suspension given. There was no written warning 
given. This event is too far in the past to be relevant even if 
it were work connected. Mr. Tolman has received regular 
standard and above evaluations including regular merit pay 
increases. No mention has been made of this event anywhere 
until now. 
3. August 18, 1986 arrest. This, has been discussed 
above under Presumption of Innocence. 
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4. June 10, 1986 incident with Margo Bergvall. This was 
an off-duty event which had no bearing at all on Mr, Tolman1s 
performance of his job duties. No charges were ever brought, no 
arrest made. There was no suspension given. There was no 
written warning given. Mr. Tolman has received a regular above 
standard evaluation including a regular merit pay increase since 
the event. No mention has been made of this event anywhere 
until now. 
5. Personal use of County vehicle. Mr. Tolman and 
others will present evidence on this point (and those listed 
above and below) at the hearing. Mr. Tolman expects to be 
treated the same in this regard as all other employees of his 
office. There was no suspension given. There was no written 
warning given. Mr. Tolman has received a regular above standard 
evaluation including a regular merit pay increase since the 
event. No mention has been made of this event anywhere until 
now. 
6. Confrontation with John Harrington. Mr. Harrington 
will be called as a witness in support of Mr._ Tolman on this 
point. There was no suspension given. There was no written 
warning given. Mr. Tolman has received a regular above standard 
evaluation including a regular merit pay increase since the 
Tolman Statement of Issues 
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event. No mention has been made of this event anywhere until 
now. 
7. Lying to a supervisor in September 1982. There was 
no suspension given. There was no written warning given. This 
event is too far in the past to be relevant. Mr. Tolman has 
received regular standard and above evaluations Including 
regular merit pay increases. No mention has been made of this 
event anywhere until now. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons given above and for reasons to be 
discussed in the pre-hearing, all charges against Mr. Tolman 
must be dismissed. Mr. Tolman should be reinstated with full 
back pay and benefits as a matter of law. The Career Service 
Council should award Mr. Tolman a reasonable attorney's fee and 
all other costs of this action. 
Respectfully submitted this Q-2^~day °^ 
October, 1986. 
©ffice of % ^aii llake (Eavcntv Aiiormm v # ? % \ 
T.L. "TED" CANNON 
County Attorney 
MICHAEL N. MARTINEZ 
Ch«< Deputy County Attorney 
M E M O R A N D U M 
C O N F I D E N T I A L 
TO: Bill Hyde 
FROM: Jerry Campbell 
DATE: September 4, 198 6 
This memorandum is in regards to the disciplinary 
action to be taken against Ralph Tolman. 
After review of the file in the investigators office 
and the file in the personnel office of the Salt Lake County 
Attorney's Office, it is my opinion tliat a dismissal action 
against Ralph Tolman would not be successful. The reasons for 
my opinion are as follows: 
The first obstacle is Salt Lake County Policy 5715 
which states "that the usual sequence of discipline shall be 
verbal warning, written warning, suspension and termination. 
Deviation from procedures may be justified depending on the 
severity and the circumstances of the action(s) to be 
disciplined." In order to side step the issue of progressive 
discipline, the argument must be made that the discipline taken 
was justified because of the actions of Ralph Tolman. 
The second hurdle is Ralph Tolman1s performance 
evaluations. A review of the performance evaluation are as 
follows: In July of 1986 he received a performance evaulation 
of 77.2% of potential which is above standard. On January's 
Q Administration 
Roger A Livingston 
Chief Deputy County Attorney 
for Administrative Affairs 
231 East 4th South Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 (801) 363-7900 
O County Attorney Victim Services 
Julie Branch 
Director 
4th Floor 
Q Justice Division 
Walter R Ellett 
Chief Deputy 
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D Investigative Agency 
Don H*rm*n 
Special Agent in Charge 
4th F IAAT 
D Civil Division 
William R Hyde 
Chief Deputy 
Q Governmental Services 
Donald Sawaya 
Chief Deputy 
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September 5, 1986 
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evaluation he received a 73% of standard which is above 
standard. In July of 1985, he received a score of 78* and 
January 1985 received a score of 73%. It is true that his 
scores for performance evaluations were the lowest of the 
investigators, however, they were consistently above standard. 
A typical evaluation comment is that Ralph is constantly 
striving to improve his performance or that Ralph is a good 
employee with good basic skills. Thus, the performance 
evaluations which reflect an employee's performance while on 
duty would not help in a disciplinary action against Mr. Tolman. 
The third hurdle is lack of documentary discipline 
evidence. Two items were found in the files which contains 
written reprimands. On December 2, 1982, John T. Nielsen 
placed Ralph Tolman on informal probation for a period of six 
months with the reprimand to be removed after six months, if 
there were no further occurrences. On September 28, 1982, John 
T. reprimanded Ralph for misrepresenting to Neil Boswell that 
he transported a witness from the airport to a motel. Since 
1982, there have been no written disciplinary actions taken 
against Ralph Tolman. 
In reference to the allegations of misconduct, they 
are as follows: 
The first D.U.I, arrest occurred in June of 1981 
wherein the Utah Highway Patrol arrested Ralph and the 
breathalizer test showed .11' to .12% alcohol. He plead to a 
lesser included offense of reckless driving. It should be 
noted that at the same time that Ralph was arrested for a 
D.U.I, a similar case' was pending against John Christensen, 
another investigator of this office. John Christensen was not 
terminated from this office based upon his D.U.I, accident and, 
therefore, Don Sawaya likewise did not terminate Ralph Tolman. 
In a meeting with Ralph Tolman,. Don verbally warned him that 
any further action would be grounds for disciplinary action. 
This warning was not reduced to writing nor was it placed in 
his file. Additionally, Ralph was suspended for five days, but 
those five days were deducted from his corap-time that he had 
accrued as of that date. The second D.U.I, was not brought to 
this office1s attention until after his third D.U.I, arrest. 
The second D.U.I, incident occurred two years ago in Midvale, 
where a Sergeant Tim Short of the Midvale Police Department 
stopped Ralph and his wife after they had left the Sage 
Lounge. Sergeant Short did not arrest Ralph but allowed him to 
obtain other transportation. The third D.U.I, arrest of August 
8, 1986 is currently pending. 
All of the above D.U.I, arrests occurred off duty. 
The first arrest occurred in a county vehichle, the other two 
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did not. The crucial question is how do the arrests relate to 
Ralph's performance as a County Attorney Investigator* and has 
this office set a pattern that a D.U.I, will only result in a 
suspension. Because his performance evaluations do not reflect 
any significant problems, his D.U.I, arrests have not affected 
his performance as a Salt Lake County investigator. 
In reference to the incidences with Margo Bergwall and 
her friends, Ralph's conduct deserves some disciplinary action 
by this office. Unfortunally. these incidences were not 
brought to our attention at the time that they occurred. 
Because this office was not made aware of the incidences at the 
time they occurred the severity of the behavior is dimished. 
At best, a charge of criminal trespass with assault and battery 
could be made against Ralph for these particular incidences. 
Again, it would be necessary to relate his irrational behavior 
to his performance as a Salt Lake County Attorney 
investigator. 
Finally, the last allegation is that Ralph violated a 
direct order of a supervisor. All Investigators were notified 
not to use their county vehicles on the weekends. Ralph's 
odometer indicated he had driven his vehicle approximately 80 
miles on two weekends with no reasonable explanation. 
Certainly, some disciplinary action should be taken 
against Ralph Tolman. Since the time he was suspended in 1981 
to the current D.U.I, charge, presents a problem of how long can 
a department hold a warning of termination over an .employee's 
head. All memos and incidences concerning Ralph's action show 
little evidence that Ralph was ever actually delivered a 
written reprimand or warning. Certainly, the employee has a 
right to receive written notice. Should a disciplinary action 
be taken against Ralph, he has the right to have that notice in 
writing stating that such conduct will result in his 
termination. Our files lack that notice to Ralph Tolman; 
i.e., that future conduct will result in a termination. 
Therefore, I believe that the proper course would be to await 
outcome of the trial of the D.U.I, arrest of August 1986; to 
continue his leave with pay status. After the trial, suspend 
him for a period of 30 days without pay and to refer him to the 
employee alcohol referral service of Salt Lake County. Most 
importantly, give Ralph an official warning that any further 
conduct of this sort will result in his immediate termination 
and place this warning in his personnel file in our office and 
at O.P.M. Then, if any further acts occur, termination would 
be sustainable. 
0922J 
pc: Don Harmon*/' 
Don Sawaya 
Sam Dawson 
